



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TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR
PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

by

Major Phillip L. Brinkley
Field Artillery

School of Advanced Military Studies
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas

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by

**Major Phillip L. Brinkley
Field Artillery**



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
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ABSTRACT

TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS, by
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In the 1980's the United States Armed Forces have been involved in two peacekeeping operations. To date, ad hoc arrangements of multinational peacekeeping forces, coupled with an extremely high rotation rate of personnel, caused each successive group to experience recurring valuable lessons.

→ This study examines training requirements, principles of command and control, and organization for a U.S. light infantry unit involved in a peacekeeping operation. The focus is on the tactical level of peacekeeping, using the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and the Beirut Multi-National Force (MNF) as case studies. The study determines the component parts of a peacekeeping force and analyzes the basic principles of successful peacekeeping operations.

The monograph concludes that peacekeeping is a difficult military mission requiring professional personnel. → The study states that peacekeeping forces must be highly trained soldiers who understand the nature and purpose of a peacekeeping mission. Finally, the study concludes that a peacekeeping force must have an internal chain of command. The most effective chain of command has one commander and one force headquarters responsible for the peacekeeping operation.

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TACTICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

1. INTRODUCTION

"Peacekeeping is not a soldier's job, but only a soldier can do it."¹

In the 1980's the United States Armed Forces have been involved in two peacekeeping operations. Whether either the armed combat marine commitment in Beirut or the Multinational Observers force in the Sinai has succeeded remains arguable. Until the 23 October 1983 terrorist bombing of the U.S. contingent of the Multinational Force in Beirut, Lebanon, most questions concerning U.S. peacekeeping efforts were politically, strategically, or operationally oriented. After the terrorist bombing, many people, especially members of the press, questioned the tactical abilities of U.S. military forces to conduct peacekeeping operations effectively.

Many of these questions are valid, considering there is no U.S. peacekeeping doctrine. In the past, ad hoc arrangements of multinational peacekeeping forces, coupled with an extremely high rotation rate of personnel, caused each successive group to experience recurring valuable lessons. This study strives to synthesize common

experiences and to aid future tactical units conducting peacekeeping operations.

The formation of the Sinai Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) represented a classic case of observer mission peacekeeping. The Multi-National Force (MNF) in Beirut was designed as an interposition force, which was heavily armed to act as a deterrent, but had limited diplomatic capability. Neither force was constituted or authorized by United Nations mandate; both forces resulted from a U.S. initiative for peace in the Middle East. The intent of this monograph is to examine the component parts of these peacekeeping forces and to analyze the basic tactical principles of a U.S. peacekeeping operation. Specifically, the monograph will examine training requirements, principles of command and control, and organization for a U.S. light infantry unit involved in a peacekeeping operation. To address the wisdom and circumstances of whether the United States should contribute military forces to peacekeeping operations is beyond the scope of this article.

Throughout the monograph, peacekeeping will be defined as:

prevention, containment, moderation, and termination of hostilities between or within states, through the medium of a peaceful third party intervention organized and directed internationally, using multinational forces of soldiers, police and/or civilians to restore and maintain peace.²

From this definition, one can ascertain two basic types of peacekeeping missions.

A. Interposition mission - Peacekeeping forces, consisting of formed bodies of armed combat troops capable of interposing themselves to fill tactical spaces between the parties of a conflict.

B. Observer missions - Peacekeeping forces consisting of observers who observe, report, effect liaison, mediate and supervise a cease fire between the parties of a conflict.³

This monograph will examine the tactical requirements for both types of peacekeeping missions.

II. SINAI MULTINATIONAL FORCE AND OBSERVER (MFO)

"Peacekeeping is to war-making what acting is to ballet--the environment is similar but the techniques are very different." *

Background and MFO Mission

The history of the MFO can be traced directly to the 1973 (Yom Kippur) Middle East War. During the October 1973 war, Egypt launched a surprise attack across the Suez Canal. The Israeli Defense Force was able to defeat the Egyptian Army and maintain control of the Sinai Peninsula. In January 1974, the U.S. Secretary of State, Dr. Henry Kissinger, negotiated an armistice which caused Israel to relinquish a large portion of the Sinai. The United Nations agreed to send a peacekeeping force, titled the United Nations Emergency Force (UNEF II), to supervise the armistice line between Egypt and Israel.

In a 1977 address to the Israeli Knesset, Egyptian President Anwar Sadat offered a peace treaty based upon the condition that Israel withdraw all military forces from the Sinai. The result of the proposal was the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty of March 1979, commonly called the Camp David Agreements. The Camp David Agreements requested the stationing of a United Nations peacekeeping force in the Sinai. Stationing of U.N. forces in the Sinai required unanimous approval of all permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. The Soviet Union, a permanent member of the UNSC, opposed both the Camp David Agreements

and the continued United Nations sponsorship of UNEF II. In June 1979 UNEF II ceased operations.


The United States, with Egyptian and Israeli concurrence, took the unprecedented step of establishing a multinational peacekeeping force without approval or mandate from the United Nations. The United States negotiated a Protocol Agreement between Egypt and Israel which established the MFO as an alternative to the UN peacekeeping force and observers. Egypt and Israel signed the Protocol on 3 August 1981 in Washington. On 25 April 1982, after fifteen years of Israeli rule, the Sinai was returned to Egypt and the MFO began operations.

Annex 1 of the Protocol Agreement specifies tasks for the MFO, among which are:

- (a) Operation of checkpoints, reconnaissance patrols, and observation posts along the international boundary and Line B, and within Zone C.
- (b) Periodic verification of the implementation of the provisions of Annex 1, not less than twice a month unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.
- (c) Additional verifications within 48 hours after the receipt of a request from either Party.
- (d) Ensuring the freedom of navigation through the Strait of Tiran in accordance with Article V of the Treaty of Peace. *

The Camp David Agreements divided the Sinai Peninsula into four sections: Zones A,B, and C in the Sinai (Egypt) and Zone D in Israel, adjacent to the international border (see map, page 6). Both Egypt and Israel are subjected to force limitations in each sector of the Peninsula. Egypt is

International Boundary, Lines of the Zones, Sectors



restricted to a mechanized infantry division in Zone A and four infantry battalions in Zone B. The MFO controls Zone C and the Israelis occupy Zone D with four mechanized infantry battalions.

Tactical Analysis

As in any military operation, the chain of command must be established at the start of peacekeeping operations.³ The overseer of the MFO, the Director General, is a United States citizen who reports directly to the governments of Egypt and Israel. His headquarters is in Rome and he is appointed for a four-year term. His responsibilities include accomplishment of the MFO's tasks and diplomatic relations. "The Director General and his staff handle all diplomatic matters between the MFO and Egypt and Israel, as well as the government of Participating States."⁴ Most of the Director General's staff are Americans.

The Force Commander, headquartered in the Sinai, assists the Director General. "The military ground commander (Force Commander) will be appointed by the Director General and will not be an American."⁵ The Force Commander's headquarters is a multinational organization consisting of fifty-eight officers and forty-seven enlisted personnel.

It is a justifiably large organization, and it is unfair to assert as some do, that the current force headquarters wield a corps-size staff to command less than a brigade deployed in the field, for no brigade headquarters is equipped to cope with the peculiar MFO problems of international liaison. ⁶

Tactically, the forces of the MFO are arrayed with the Fiji Infantry Battalion (FIJIBATT) located in sectors one and two of Zone C (see map p. 6). The Colombian Battalion (COLBATT) occupies and patrols the central two sections (three and four) of Zone C. Both the FIJIBATT and COLBATT headquarters are located at North Camp in El Gorah. The U.S. Battalion (USBATT) headquarters is South Camp at Sharm el Sheikh. The USBATT patrols and occupies the harsh, mountainous region in sectors five and six of Zone C; it also has an on-order mission to patrol the Islands of Tiran and Snafir, both located in the Tiran Straits.⁷

In addition, an Italian Coastal Patrol Unit (CPU) provides four ships to cover the southern third of the Gulf of Aqaba. A Civilian Observer Unit (COU) of twenty-five U.S. citizens performs verification inspections through air reconnaissances and ground spot checks in all four zones within the Peninsula. Many other nations provide combat support and combat service support to the tactical units. These nations are: France (Fixed Wing Aviation), Australia/New Zealand (Rotary Wing Aviation), Holland (Signal and Military Police Units), United States (Logistics Support Element), Uruguay (Transport and Engineer Units), and Great Britain (Staff Headquarters Units).

All units have an internal independent chain of command; the Force Commander, however, controls all units operationally.

U.S. military units designated to participate in the MFO will be placed under operational control

of the Commander, Multinational Force and Observers, upon entering his area of responsibility (Sinai). Operational Command of U.S. military units will be retained by the appropriate Unified Command Commander....Commander of the U.S. military units under the operational control of the Commander, MFO, will retain command of their subordinate/attached elements.... Accordingly, each U.S. commander will retain full authority to implement disciplinary actions under the specifications of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to include expanded authorities as may deemed appropriate by the Executive Agent."

Zone C comprises twenty-four observation posts and fourteen checkpoints. Many are so isolated that the most practical method to reach the detachment is by helicopter. To communicate with the sector control centers all checkpoints and observation posts use VHF radios. The sector control center uses a microwave multichannel system to report to battalion headquarters. In addition, each sector control center can communicate directly with the Force Commander's Headquarters through a radio-wire integration system.

The overall security of observation posts and checkpoints is tenuous. Checkpoints, obviously, are located on major routes. These positions can easily be attacked with explosives or automatic weapons discharged from vehicles. Armed squads occupy both checkpoints and observation posts. The sites have combat wire and well-located fighting positions. Protective overhead cover is not available. Perimeter fences are not always positioned to prevent hand-thrown grenades or satchel charges from reaching interior

facilities. Most positions have some illumination capabilities such as flares, flood lights, or pyrotechnics.⁷

Considering the relative isolation and low target value of most outposts, the only organization that might benefit from attacking them would be radical Arab terrorists, either independent or state supported. The terrorist's purpose might be "to precipitate the abrogation of the Egypt-Israel Peace Treaty by forcing the withdrawal of the MFO."¹⁰ However, the MFO Force Headquarters developed a threat assessment which concluded that no immediate probable terrorist threat to the MFO could be identified.¹¹ The history of the MFO in the Sinai is relatively non-violent. There have been no terrorist related casualties. The MFO has sustained only two casualties wounded by land mines. All deaths to service members were a result of traffic or scuba diving accidents.

The MFO has no internal intelligence-gathering capability to assist in forecasting possible terrorist assaults. The rationale is that the MFO is a neutral observer conducting a monitoring mission. Intelligence gathering might upset the political or military sensitivities of either Egypt or Israel. Furthermore, neither Egypt nor Israel provides security updates to the Field Commander, MFO. The primary intelligence-gathering activities of the MFO are contacts with local civilians, and informal staff liaison with Egyptian or Israeli military and diplomatic personnel.

Training against terrorists involves little more than insuring vigilance and normal military preparation. Normal military preparation entails training for war. The MFO is a military body placed in an area of conflict, created to observe, report, and monitor compliance with the Egypt-Israel peace treaty. Soldiers are basically trained in the use of force for war making; the MFO mission implies that peacekeeping soldiers need these skills but should refrain from their use. This suggests that peacekeeping, as opposed to warmaking, requires a different attitude as well as different military skills.

Probably the most poignant example of an attitude reformation can be seen in a statement by LTC R.J. Wilkinson, who conducted a UN peacekeeping observer mission.

Obviously, my military training, including two staff courses, had some indirect benefit in this situation, but was not of much help in the diplomatic/political field. In the case of a shoot-up, the first reaction of a military man is to see it through to a successful conclusion by one side or the other. This is not the case in an Observer Mission; the immediate task is to get the shooting stopped by convincing (not ordering) both sides to agree to a cease-fire. Then, the incident is followed up with an investigation to find out exactly what happened, (who or what started it and what damage was done) and then to urge both sides to cease and desist in order 'to avoid bloodshed and reduce tension.' What was so frustrating was the seeming futility of impartiality, objectivity, logic, sincerity, and any number of other admirable traits - they didn't seem to alter anything. Finally, one was reduced to two necessary human characteristics: patience and understanding, plus any amount of tact and diplomacy! As a general rule, these latter traits are not always found in military men.¹²

Most countries sending military forces to the MFO understand the differences between the roles of a peacekeeper and a combatant. The concept of training for peacekeeping operations of MFO forces varies between countries.

Some countries recruit their enlisted men for peacekeeping duty only, train them and discharge them after they have served their tours. Other countries simply reorganize and retrain their present units.¹³

DA Circular 11-85-2: Personnel Policies for the Sinai Multi-National Force and Observers outlines the United States Army's personnel policies for peacekeeping in the MFO. The DA Circular specifically forbids the creation of 'MFO only units' and directs that forces to be used in the Sinai be drawn from existing units.

At present, two U.S. divisions send forces to the MFO, the 101st Air Assault Division and the 82nd Airborne Division. The procedure of both divisions is to create a battalion task force six months prior to its deployment to the Sinai. The infantry battalion task force cannot exceed 808 personnel, consisting of: an infantry battalion headquarters, a headquarters company, three rifle companies, a combat support company, a helicopter support element and a signal support element. The task force deploys with its organic equipment, except mortars, anti-tank and air defense missiles, and basic load of ammunition. The MFO provides the basic load of small arms ammunition.

Furthermore, the MFO supplements the battalion task force with additional transportation for logistic support.¹⁴

Training for the battalion task force begins at home station. (Fort Bragg, NC or Fort Campbell, KY). The XVIII Airborne Corps, Letter of Instruction, (LOI) Subject: LOI, MFO, dated 11 April 1985, lists mandatory training. The training is phased into pre-deployment training and in-country/sustainment training. The Task Force Commander develops the exact training plan within the guidelines of the XVIII Airborne Corps' LOI. The Task Force Commander may include additional training. Pre-deployment training for infantry covers twenty-four subjects and takes approximately 243 hours. The list includes:

MFO Mission, organization, and background (1 hr)
Identify a minefield (1 hr)
A.R.E. and I.D.F. order of battle (2 hrs)
OPFOR weapons training (4 hrs)
MEDEVAC (1/2 hr)
Field sanitation (1 hr)
Heat injury prevention and treatment (1/2 hr)
Navigate in a desert environment (8 hrs)
CD training (16 hrs)
Handling POW's (1 hr)
Arabic familiarization course (40 hrs)
Legal subjects (1 hr)
Patrolling (4 hr)
Standards of conduct (1 hr)
Weapons qualification (24 Hrs)
Desert survival techniques (8 hrs)
Rules of engagement (1 hr)
Drivers training (40 hrs)
Counter-terrorist training (4 hrs)
Peacekeeping skills (1 hr)
Pathfinder and slingload Ops (4 hrs)
Mountaineering (8 hrs)
Scuba instructor training (8 hrs)
FTX (72 hrs)¹⁵

Specific training for all members of the MFO begins with a concentrated effort that insures each soldier understands the basic terms of the Egypt-Israeli treaty, the MFO standing operating procedures, and the rules of engagement. The rules of engagement state under what circumstances a member of the MFO may discharge his weapon. The guidance given to MFO soldiers is:

Your principal duty as a member of the MFO is to observe and report. You are armed with your individual weapon for self protection. The firing of your weapon at another individual will be done only as a last resort and to protect your life or the life of another member of the MFO. Never use more force than necessary. Whenever possible request orders from your commander before you use force.¹⁴

In order for a military organization to be proficient, it must be tactically competent. The Multinational Force and Observers is a highly successful military organization. Undoubtedly, several factors contribute to the MFO's tactical success. First, the MFO was formed based on the mutual request of conflicting parties. The fact that all parties involved accepted conditions of the Egypt-Israel Truce and Protocol virtually ensured the MFO would not meet a hostile response. Second, there was sufficient time to organize and plan the details of the MFO. This involved the establishment of zones and sectors and the location of checkpoints and observation posts. Third, there is a highly effective chain-of-command consisting of dedicated personnel from the Director General in Rome to soldiers at isolated outposts. The chain-of-command makes a concerted effort to

develop unity among the component units of the MFO. Examples of these efforts include the peacekeepers' distinctive blue beret and the MFO medal. The MFO's high morale and numerous voluntary assignment extensions reflect the success of the chain-of-command. Finally, there are continuous training programs for military members of the MFO. As a minimum, the combat skills that MFO soldiers practice involve patrolling, helicopter operations, and first aid training. Patrolling is a major factor in accomplishing the MFO verification mission. Patrolling in the austere environment of the Sinai requires map reading abilities by all squad members. A knowledge of helicopter operations is extremely valuable, because patrol extractions, medevacs, and resupply operations are conducted primarily by air. In the extreme temperatures of the desert climate and the hazardous terrain of the Sinai, preventive medicine and first aid training are required to insure survival. Military tactical proficiency and an understanding of the mission are intrinsic to the overall success of the Multinational Force and Observers.

III BEIRUT MULTI-NATIONAL FORCE (MNF)

International peacekeeping forces can never enforce world peace, for they lack both the mandate authority and the operational capacity to do so.¹

Background and MNF Mission

On 6 June 1982, Israeli Defense Forces invaded Lebanon in operation 'Peace for Galilee'. The purpose of the operation was to prevent the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) from using Lebanon as a base to conduct cross-border military operations into Israel. By early August 1982, Israel had occupied most of southern Lebanon and had a large number of PLO forces surrounded in Beirut. The Israeli and Lebanese Governments reached an agreement to allow an orderly and safe evacuation of Palestinian civilians from Beirut. Because Israel had rejected United Nation diplomatic or military involvement in the area, the Lebanese government asked France, Italy and the United States to assist the Lebanese Army with the civilian evacuation. The duration of this assistance was not to exceed thirty days. By 10 September 1982 this multi-national force had withdrawn from Lebanon.

In mid-September, following the massacres of Palestinian civilians at Sabra and Shatila refugee camps by Lebanese Christian Phalangist militiamen, the United Nations prepared to introduce two thousand (2,000) UNIFIL (United Nation Interim Force in Lebanon) troops with the mission of protecting civilians. In a surprising move, the Lebanese

government requested the return of the MNF as opposed to the UNIFIL. The MNF reentered Beirut in late September 1982

to provide an interposition force at agreed locations in Beirut; its mandate was to facilitate the restoration of the Lebanese government's sovereignty and authority. Combat responsibilities were expressly ruled out.²

Although initially well received by the population of Lebanon, the MNF increasingly became a target by leftist militiamen. In addition the Israeli Defense Forces harassed the MNF. In September 1983, with the withdrawal of the Israeli Defense Force from the mountainous region near Beirut, the MNF found itself in the middle of a civil war. On one side was the Lebanese Army and the Christian Phalangist militia opposed by the Syrian backed Druze, Shiite, and Palestinian militia. The MNF began to intervene militarily on the side of the Lebanese Army. The United States gave naval gunfire and air support to the Lebanese Army. The French assisted with air support. The Druze and Shia Muslims responded by attacks on U.S. and French positions. This resulted in the deaths of 259 Americans and 84 French troops. British and Italian forces remained relatively neutral, and their positions were not attacked throughout their stay in Lebanon. The Italian's suffered one casualty and the British lost no troops at all.³

Due to these events, world newsmakers began to portray the MNF as a participant, rather than peacekeeper, in the Lebanese conflict. By December 1983 it was readily apparent

that the nations of the MNF desired to extricate themselves from the Lebanon quagmire. In February 1984 the Italian contingent of the MNF announced withdrawal from Lebanon and the U.S. Marines were ordered to redeploy to naval vessels off shore. The British contingent had departed. There was one last major effort to have the United Nations establish a peacekeeping force in Lebanon; however, that effort failed. In March 1984 President Reagan announced the formal end of US participation in the MNF.

Tactical Analysis

Each nation contributing forces to the MNF occupied a sector of Beirut (see map, page 20). All nations provided an infantry battalion task force augmented by armor vehicles, except the British, who provided one armor reconnaissance squadron. However, the occupation of Beirut was not a coordinated, unified effort. Each country participating in the MNF arrived and worked independently.

The U.S. contingent to the MNF, the 32nd Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU), was inserted into Lebanon on 29 September 1982 via an amphibious landing at the Port of Beirut. The United States sector of operations centered around Beirut International Airport. Bordering the airport is the slum area of Burj-Al-Barjneh, which houses Palestinian refugees and Shia Muslims. Sniper fire from this area became one of the greatest concerns for the marines.


On 3 November 1982 the 24th MAU replaced the 32nd MAU.

The task force now consisted of:

<u>24 Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU)</u>	<u>Strength</u>
One Infantry Battalion (including 81mm mortars, DRAGONS, TOWs) (tank platoon M-60A1 and an artillery battery of 105mm howitzers, later replaced by 155mm, M198)	1,200
MAU Service Support Group	300
Helicopter Squadron consisting of: 4 x AH-1 (Cobra) 4 x UH-1 (Huey) 5 x CH53E 10 x CH 46	250
	Total 1,750

The French deployed to the once fashionable sea-front area of northwest Beirut. They had the responsibility for patrolling this area and the Green Line which separates Christian East from Muslim West Beirut. The Italians inhabited the area between the American and French contingents. This included the open area north of the airport and dense urban areas of West Beirut. The British, the smallest contingent of one hundred personnel, occupied the suburban areas on the southeast side of the city. The British sector location was east of the Green Line.*

One of the weakest areas in the Multi-National Force organization was the lack of command and control. It is important that command relationships be agreed upon prior to the commencement of any military venture or operation. As in most military undertakings, effective command and control in peacekeeping operations are characterized by: defined



command relationships, effective liaison, good communications, and common staff procedures.

A Force Headquarters should be established in the area of operations and must be able to command a number of national contingents operating over a large area in a variety of roles.⁵

Unfortunately, the MNF did not establish an effective chain of command at any time during its commitment in Lebanon. The members of the MNF (the United States, Italy, France, and later Great Britain) negotiated separate bilateral agreements with the Lebanese Government. The separate agreements contained the status of forces and the contingents' missions while in Lebanon. There was no formal commander, headquarters, or multi-national staff to coordinate missions, effect liaison, pass intelligence or handle reports. In reality, the MNF was a loose federation of four nations each with a similar mission.

Each of the four nations in the MNF had an internal chain of command; most nations reported directly to their respective ambassadors. The contingent commanders met regularly in the Presidential Palace in Ba'abda; however, most of the discussions were political or operational in nature. "Commanders functioned in support of their own national interest and often failed to pass on vital tactical information to other MNF contingents."⁶

Within the United States contingent, there were several problems with the internal chain of command. Although the operational chain of command was effective in

the planning and support of the U.S. contingent to the MNF, they neglected certain tactical responsibilities. The operational chain of command that existed for US Forces in Lebanon was as follows:

<u>Military Branch of Commander</u>	<u>Chain of Command</u>	<u>Location of Command</u>
	NCA	Washington
	JCS (Advisory)	Washington
Army	USCINCEUR	Belgium
Navy	CINCUSNAVEUR	Naples
Navy	COMSIXTHFLT	Naples
Navy	CO U.S. FORCES LEBANON	Afloat
Marine	CO U.S. FORCES ASHORE	Beirut
Marine	CO MARINE BATTALION	Beirut

First, the entire operational chain of command failed to analyze changing missions. The Marines viewed their mission in Lebanon as part of a peacekeeping force. Implied in this mission is that U.S. Marines must be visible. The overall mission was perceived as diplomatic. Although this analysis may have been correct initially, the situation in Lebanon changed. Once US forces began assisting the Lebanese Army, the perception was that the U.S. was no longer a disinterested peacekeeper. Some parties viewed the U.S. Marines as the enemy. "Over time then, not only did the mission change, the tactical situation changed as well. However the political reason for being there remained the same, peacekeeping."⁷ The chain of command failed to

understand the policy-strategy mismatch and failed to translate the changing roles in understandable terms to the deployed forces or senior strategy makers.

Second, the operational chain of command "failed to properly inspect and supervise the defensible posture" of the MAU which "constituted tacit approval of security measures and procedures."⁶ Although there were numerous inspections and visits, most of the senior officers in the chain of command were naval personnel. These naval officers did not have an infantry perspective of a good defensive position, unit effectiveness, enemy threat, and other concerns of a ground commander. The COMSIXTHFLT, Admiral Martin, never inspected the security of the ground forces, although he had been in Beirut at least six times.⁷

Third, the operational chain of command failed to provide specific intelligence to the Commander U.S. Forces Ashore. The U.S. contingent divided intelligence functions into two areas: conventional military intelligence and terrorist tactics. The chain of command rated the conventional military intelligence as outstanding. These duties included the ability to locate hostile enemy artillery, tank positions, and militia strong points. Unfortunately, the intelligence concerning terrorist tactics was unsatisfactory. The problem was a total lack of specific, usable information. The Commander, US Forces Ashore had access to all national acquisition means. These methods produced a large volume of raw data. For example,

during the period between May and October 1983, the Force Commander received over one hundred (100) warnings of car bombings. Never, though did he receive information on how, when or where a threat was to be carried out. Basically, "he was not provided with timely intelligence, tailored to his specific operational needs, that was necessary to defend against a broad spectrum of threats he faced."¹⁰ Obviously these operational chain of command failures contributed to the deaths of 241 personnel in October 1983 when a truck loaded with TNT penetrated the Battalion Landing Team Headquarters building and detonated.

Finally, one chain of command failure was not the direct responsibility of the operational chain of command. The operational chain of command does not include such matters as administration, discipline, internal organization and training except when a subordinate commander requests assistance.¹¹ The chain of command responsible for administration, discipline, internal organization and training is the service chain of command. The service chain of command may be described as full command less operational control. The service chain of command that existed for U.S. Forces in Lebanon was as follows:

<u>Military Branch of Commander</u>	<u>Chain of Command</u>	<u>Location of Commander</u>
Marine	Commandant, U.S Marine Corps	Washington DC
Marine	CG, Fleet Marine Force, Atlantic	Norfolk, VA
Marine	CG, 2nd Marine	Camp LeJeune,

	Division	NC
Marine	CO U.S. Forces Ashore	Beirut
Marine	CO Marine Battalion	Beirut

The Department of Defense Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act (Long Commission) concluded: "...the USMNF was not effectively trained, organized, staffed or supported to deal effectively with the terrorist threat in Lebanon."¹² The Long Commission did not find the service chain of command culpable of training, organization, or staff failures. The Long Commission incorrectly placed the onus on the operational chain of command.

Although CG, FMFLANT and his subordinate commands trained the MAU and its parts and prepared them for deployment, and although these USMC Service authorities and the Commandant himself, and members of their staffs, had visited the MAU, the message sent by the Long Commission is that the Marine generals in this type command chain bore no responsibility at all for security measures not taken in Beirut.¹³

The United States contingent was deployed in September 1982, with an understanding of four basic conditions: 1) the force would operate in a relatively benign environment, 2) the Lebanese Army would provide security, 3) the mission would be of limited duration and 4) the force would be evacuated in the event of an attack. Based on these conditions and the approval of the USCINCEUR, the Marine Commander issued rules of engagement. The rules of engagement may be summarized by stating that the U.S.

contingent to the MNF would only engage in defensive actions. As the situation in Lebanon deteriorated, the Lebanese Government could not satisfactorily fulfill the first three conditions. The net effect was the continued erosion of security of U.S. Forces.¹⁴

Following the 18 April 1983 destruction of the U.S. Embassy, the USCINCEUR expanded the rules of engagement for members of the U.S. MNF. These new rules of engagement were printed on a "White Card" and were required to be carried by all members of the U.S. MNF. The "White Card" stated:

The mission of the Multi-national Force (MNF) is to keep the peace. The following rules of engagement will be read and fully understood by all members of the U.S. contingent of the MNF:

- When on post, mobile or foot patrol, keep a loaded magazine in the weapon, weapons will be on safe, with no rounds in the chamber.
- Do not chamber a round unless instructed to do so by a commissioned officer unless you must act in immediate self-defense where deadly force is authorized.
- Keep ammunition for crew-served weapons readily available but not loaded in the weapon. Weapons will be on safe at all times.
- Call local forces to assist in all self-defense efforts. Notify next senior command immediately.
- Use only the minimum degree of force necessary to accomplish the mission.
- Stop the use of force when it is no longer required.

- If effective fire is received, direct return fire at a distinct target only. If possible, use friendly sniper fire.
- Respect civilian property; do not attack it unless absolutely necessary to protect friendly forces.
- Protect innocent civilians from harm.
- Respect and protect recognized medical agencies such as Red Cross, Red Crescent, etc.

These rules of engagement will be followed by all members of the U.S. MNF unless otherwise directed.¹³

Initially, each nation seemed to operate tactically according to the style of warfare derived from its latest operations. The experiences in Northern Ireland influenced the British tactics. They patrolled in flak vests and berets, and used uncamouflaged, mineproofed vehicles. The French and Italians operated in much the same style as the British. The U.S. Marines occupied positions centered around Beirut airport. Companies surrounding the perimeter were entrenched with overhead protective cover. The marine uniform was utilities with helmet, flak vest, belt suspenders, two canteens of water, M16 rifle, flashlight, first aid kit and 120 rounds of ammunition. During darkness night vision goggles were issued. Vehicles were camouflaged in desert pattern paint. Marines conducted patrols from this base camp.¹⁴

While conducting patrols, MNF soldiers could not arrest or detain civilian or military personnel. In addition, the MNF soldiers were not permitted to assist the Lebanese Army should hostile fire occur. The patrols did have freedom of

movement and could cross into an allies' sector without prior coordination.¹⁷

Nevertheless, a static mentality began to appear in the U.S. contingent. "On 31 August (1983), Marine patrols were terminated in the face of sniper, RPG and artillery threats."¹⁸ The US Marines barricaded themselves around Beirut International Airport, manned the perimeter, checkpoints, and prepared for a siege.

As the French learned in Diem Bien Phu and the British discovered in Northern Ireland, stationary positions are vulnerable to quick assaults or protracted sieges. Beirut and the Marine Corps can now be added to this list.¹⁹

The U.S. Marines were chosen as the U.S. contingent to the MNF because "they looked good. This was a political job and because of their discipline and esprit de corps, they could carry it out very well....they were mobile. They can pack up and leave in 24 hours."²⁰ The ability to "look good" and "be mobile" were appropriate qualities. Unfortunately, because the MAU deployed rapidly, there was not sufficient time to train for a peacekeeping mission. The Marines received a mission, made an amphibious landing into Beirut, secured an airport, established a base camp, and conducted patrols. There is little evidence that the Marines prepared for the peacekeeping mission differently than they would a combat mission.

The Beirut Multi-National Force was not a tactical success. The obvious reason is because the MNF did not accomplish the assigned mission. A closer examination

reveals several factors that contributed to the MNF failure. The Lebanese Government requested the establishment of the MNF. The independent nations of the MNF negotiated separate bilateral agreements with Lebanon. The result of this action was that the MNF never established a force headquarters or an effective chain of command. Within the U.S. contingent, the chain of command neglected its tactical responsibilities. This failure resulted in the death of 241 military personnel in October 1983. Second, political and military leaders were insensitive to the changing situation in Lebanon. When the MNF began to intervene militarily to assist the Lebanese Army, the population perceived the MNF as a participant in the conflict. Finally, because of the urgency of the situation in Lebanon, the MNF forces never received appropriate training. Combat forces were placed in a hostile environment and given a peacekeeping mission. Undoubtedly, these factors contributed to the failure of the MNF.

IV TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Peacekeeping is, if not a routine assignment, at least a potential assignment for military personnel from all over the world, including members of the U.S. Army.¹

The Multi-National Force and Observers (MFO) and Multi-National Force (MNF) are valuable sources of tactical information for future United States peacekeeping operations. Both forces resulted from U.S. efforts to have peace in the Middle East. The United Nations neither mandated nor assisted either force. Few would dispute the success of the MFO or the failure of the MNF. One can gain valuable lessons for future peacekeeping endeavors by closely examining the tactical successes and failures of the MFO and the MNF.

The first tactical requirement of a peacekeeping operation is complete understanding of the units' mission by participating members. The MFO has a coherent mission with specific tasks outlined in the Camp David Protocol Agreements. The MFO conducts training during the pre-deployment and in-country phases to insure that every soldier understands the reasons for his/her presence. Within the MNF, "the original mission statement was modified by directives on four occasions."² These changes occurred during the period 25 September 1982 to 7 May 1983. The mission statement was so ambiguous that members of the chain of command did not agree on the exact mission.³

Another tactical consideration of peacekeeping operations involves the force structure. A peacekeeping

force must be tailored to accomplish the mission. There are, however, other considerations in determining size and composition of these forces. These considerations are:

- 1) The force must be large enough to defend itself and establish a visible presence, but not so large as to be tempted to impose its will on either party in a conflict.
- 2) It must be large enough to have the flexibility to concentrate forces in response to a local threat.
- 3) Within the force, no one national element can appear to be dominant over the others.⁴

A review of the force structure of all United Nation peacekeeping operations shows a heavy preponderance of infantry-type units, augmented by support personnel. "Current U.S. Army light forces, with minimal augmentation, are organized, equipped, trained, and ideally suited for the conduct of peacekeeping operations."⁵ The standard size unit deployed is a battalion. This is a logical decision considering the battalion is generally the smallest fully staffed, self-contained unit.

The U.S. contingent to the MFO is an augmented battalion. The basic element of the U.S contingent to the MNF was a battalion landing team. The mission determines the exact augmentation and composition of an inserted unit. The MFO, conducting an observer mission, has little reason to take mortars or anti-tank weapons. The MNF, conducting an interposition mission, had excellent rationale for taking heavy armament.

The third tactical consideration derived from the MFO and MNF is the responsibilities of the chain of command. The most effective chain of command is one which has one commander and one force headquarters responsible for the peacekeeping operation. Contingent nations report directly to the Force Commander. The Force Commander ultimately is responsible for supervising and coordinating the accomplishment of the mission, communicating changes in the mission, and responding to committed units.

Considerations regarding the chain of command and the composition of a headquarters are related. As any headquarters will be international and multilingual, if at all practical, it is best to have only one headquarters - that of the force commander - and to have a simple chain of command directly to units. Contributing nations must provide force headquarters personnel at the time of deployment, and it would be an asset if these personnel had some training in peacekeeping staff procedures.*

The fourth requirement entails the understanding of how political factors influence the tactical execution of peacekeeping operations. Specifically, rules of engagement (use of force), freedom of movement, and area of operations are mandated by the political process. Often, political restrictions hinder the military commander in the conduct of the mission. Had political factors not restricted movement, the U.S. contingent of the MNF would not have assumed a static, barricade position. The only option available to the tactical commander is to comply with instructions and inform the chain of command of the tactical implications of

a political decision. Political and military leaders must understand each others' perceptions and problems.

The fifth requirement for peacekeeping operations is the special training needed to enhance the tactical skill of a peacekeeping unit. Pre-mission tactical training should include, as a minimum:

- 1) operation of checkpoints and observation posts
- 2) patrolling
- 3) map reading
- 4) weapons and equipment identification
- 5) culture, language, habits, religion, and characteristics of the local indigenous personnel
- 6) environmental survival classes
- 7) knowledge of first aid
- 8) civil disturbance training

Well-trained U.S. infantry units often incorporate the above list into their normal tactical training. One source states, "well trained operational units have little difficulty adapting to peacekeeping even in the tense situation which usually accompanies the formation of a new force."⁷ Participants in the MFO disagree with this assessment.

One survey question asked whether soldiers who were well trained in military skills still required additional training for peacekeeping. More than 80 percent of the soldiers, across three units, felt such training necessary.⁸

The final tactical requirement for a unit engaging in peacekeeping operations is an attitude reformation. Combat

units are trained to be aggressive. Peacekeeping soldiers need to be firm yet fair. Training for a combat mission entails destruction of the enemy. Peacekeeping requires diplomacy, tact, patience, and understanding.

Every soldier assigned peacekeeping duties ideally would be a linguist who is part politician, part diplomat, and a genuinely decent person who can be respected by all parties to the conflict and who is intellectually capable of understanding the issues without becoming emotionally aligned with one point of view. All peacekeepers should be fully qualified soldiers who are mature and disciplined.⁷

V CONCLUSIONS

First and foremost, peacekeepers are predominantly military personnel who are trained to military standards and not in the performance of law enforcement duties. Their presence is for the purpose of maintaining a mandate agreed upon formally or tacitly by opposing forces in a situation of conflict.¹

To the casual observer, peacekeeping appears an uncomplicated military mission. Peacekeeping connotes a noncombat role for the forces assigned the mission. Military forces either interpose themselves between conflicting factions or supervise a cease fire between the parties of a conflict. However, upon close examination peacekeeping is a difficult military mission requiring professional personnel.

Nations contributing military forces normally provide an augmented infantry battalion. Peacekeeping forces must be highly trained professional soldiers who understand the nature and purpose of the peacekeeping mission. Peacekeeping soldiers should be conditioned to be impartial, diplomatic, and patient in the performance of their duties. In addition, these soldiers need intensive training to enhance their tactical military skills.

An internal peacekeeping operational chain of command should be established. The most effective chain of command has one commander and one force headquarters responsible for the peacekeeping operation. The Force Commander is responsible for supervising and coordinating the mission and the welfare of the committed units.

Without question, peacekeeping operations rather than open hostilities offer the best alternative in many areas of the world. In the future, U.S. military forces very probably will assume additional peacekeeping missions. In order for U.S. forces to be successful, decision-makers should consider the tactical requirements of organization, training, and command and control outlined in this monograph.

ENDNOTES

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